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One of the great issues for governments and related organisations everywhere is that of 
staying close to their citizens and maintaining accountability through the provision of 
accurate, trustworthy and complete information. The size of an organisation can often 
impede open and timely information delivery, and the complexity of government 
structures can cause frustration and suspicion. Given the size and complexity of the EU, it 
could be considered reasonable to suppose that the EU would have institutional barriers 
to the integrity of the information provided to the public. Indeed, criticism of the EU is 
frequently framed in terms of its supposed lack of accountability and the claim that it is 
out of touch with its citizens (Gehrke 2019). To counter this, the EU makes increasing use 
of online systems to render its working practices visible to the public to facilitate scrutiny 
and improve transparency. However, these online systems have frequently been 
introduced without reliable and consistent quality assurance (QA) processes to ensure the 
accuracy of the information in the public domain in order to promote the institutional trust 
that the EU seeks. Furthermore, the EU ministerial declaration of 2005 argues for 
promoting ‘public confidence’ in information provision for e-government. Confidence and 
trust are inextricably linked, as this article shows. Drawing on 22 qualitative interviews 
with EU officials and representatives of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), this article 
demonstrates that low QA is in fact a deliberate policy, with the European Commission 
openly acknowledging its reliance on public control to police the information it provides 
through its online systems. This creates a transparency paradox by allowing CSOs to take 
advantage of the weakness in information QA to weaponise their information to attack the 
EU. This is a key consideration, not only for the EU but for all governments and non-
governmental organisations across the world. A perceived weakness in information 
provision which subverts the building of trust, particularly political trust, increases the 
scope for individual or state actors to exploit the internet to weaken and undermine citizen 
participation. This article tackles the issue through primary research to demonstrate the 
dangers of weaponised information in the modern political arena. 
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The 2016 Brexit referendum result reflected a crisis of trust in politics and politicians. 
Abrams and Travaglino (2018) show through their examination of low trust and fears about 
immigration in the run-up to the referendum that this appears to have driven voter choice. 
Trust is a significant factor in the way that citizens respond to public institutions and 
politicians. Political trust can be defined as the ‘faith’ that people have in their government 
or institution (Abrams and Travaglino 2018). If this type of trust is an essential part of the 
relationship between citizens, the state and its representatives, then any damage done to 
that relationship may be expected to cause disquiet among politicians and resentment on 
the part of citizens. Metlay (2013) argues that citizen trust provides political legitimacy for 
democratic organisations and Schafheitle, Weibel, Meidert and Leuffen (2019) state that 
citizen trust in political institutions is necessary for any political system to function: it is 
fundamental. Without it, citizen confidence in the quality and accuracy of the information 
disseminated by political organisations is both compromised and weakened. Schafheitle et 
al. go on to argue that ‘unstable trust in European institutions threatens effective 
governance’ (2019: 1). This is a key point and is further explored in this article by 
examining the governance processes through which the European Union (EU) provides 
online information to its citizens as a means of enhancing trust in the EU to strengthen its 
democratic legitimacy. The article goes on to analyse the unintended consequences of the 
EU’s weak quality assurance (QA) processes, allowing the information produced to be 
weaponised against them, potentially weakening both trust and democratic legitimacy. In 
its analysis of the resultant transparency paradox, this article adds to a growing body of 
literature on political e-governance in large governmental organisations, a topic of 
increasing importance in the context of a fast-developing atmosphere of distrust in 
governments across the world (Bannister and Connolly 2012; Field 2019).  
In the aftermath of the United Kingdom’s (UK) ‘Brexit’ referendum result and in the context 
of anticipated electoral gains for far right parties across Europe, the Petitions Committee 
of the European Parliament convened a public hearing Restoring citizen confidence and 
trust in the European Project (European Ombudsman 2017): a title that could be seen to 
reflect concerns on the part of the EU to shore up any damage done to the organisation 
as a result of the events in Britain. Indeed, during the hearing, the European Ombudsman, 
Emily O’Reilly, urged the EU institutions to improve the transparency of law-making as a 
necessary condition for restoring public trust in the EU. In her comments, however, she 
acknowledged that the public appetite for detailed information about EU processes is 
limited: 
The EU institutions need to be open not so that every single citizen can be 
fully informed all the time about the minutiae of what’s going on, but rather 
that their elected representatives or civil society organisations can act in 
their interests (European Ombudsman 2017).  
In this statement, O’Reilly recognises that, although having the means to access and 
analyse detailed and specific information about activity in the EU’s institutions, relatively 
few citizens choose to do so. Rather, this role is exercised by civil society groups acting 
on behalf of the public, ostensibly in the interests of transparency, which O’Reilly suggests 
will promote public trust in the institutions. This article challenges this assumption by 
demonstrating that the increased availability of information can undermine, rather than 
increase citizen trust. The article also explores why and how civil society groups scrutinise 
the activities of the EU institutions on behalf of citizens. In doing this, the article adds to 
a continuing dialogue concerning the involvement of civil society in matters of 
transparency and accountability, while considering the notion of promoting trust through 
information provision (Abrams and Travaglino 2018) and governance (Fung 2015; 
Schafheitle et al. 2019). Furthermore, the article investigates why, despite a significant 
growth in the numbers and accessibility of online systems, independent analysis of the 
veracity of this information frequently identifies errors in both the accuracy of the 
information provided (Field 2013; Greenwood and Dreger 2013) and of information 
exposing non-compliant practices within the institutions. With the supposed relationship 
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between the openness of the EU institutions and public trust identified by the Ombudsman, 
this article essentially addresses two questions: 
1. How does the practice of inviting informal public scrutiny of information enhance public 
trust? 
2. To what extent does the provision of transparency through online provision of accurate 
and complete information enhance the trustworthiness and integrity of the EU? 
Within both questions lie complexities around context and communication which makes 
informal public scrutiny of information and the idea of transparency through online 
platforms a complicated and difficult problem for many organisations, not just the EU 
(Stvilia 2008). Contextually, there are special issues for the EU which relate to its 
structure, its resources and its culture. It is a large, complex and well-resourced 
organisation, with some departments acting in what appear to be independent ways; a 
point acknowledged by Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2008) who identified ‘sectoral 
differentiation’: variations in working processes, norms and routines amongst the 
Commission directorates general (DGs). A number of scholars have argued that this issue 
is a function of EU institutional rivalry and administrative power struggles - a feature 
common to large institutions such as this, especially those with political leanings 
(Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008; Ashkenas 2011; Bach, De Francesco, Maggetti and Ruffing 
2016; Kassim 2008; Kortelainen and Koeppen 2018). The clear cultural distance between 
groups and departments causes fragmentation between the different sections of the 
organisation, which can lead to problems in the consistency of communication with the 
public. This is significant because inconsistency in information provision on the part of a 
governmental organisation can affect trust and the provision of information clearly 
demonstrates non-compliant practices. This may lead the public to question the veracity, 
and therefore the integrity, of that information. Accurate, timely and rule-compliant 
information provision is thus inextricably linked to trust. The integrity of the information 
placed in the public domain must be accurate in order for the public to invest their trust 
in it and in those providing it.  
The notion of engaging with the public through an online platform seems itself to be a 
proxy for communicating with them directly. An early study by the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported that it is not necessarily the 
case that e-government and the provision of information online will improve either public 
participation or transparency (Tolbert and Mossberger 2006). Merely providing information 
does not constitute communication. In fact, Habermas’s notion of the public sphere 
characterises the environment in which the public can expect to engage with information 
provided by the state:  
Autonomy from state and economic power. Discourse must be based on the 
concerns of citizens as a public rather than driven by the media of money 
and administrative power that facilitate the operations of the market and 
state (Habermas in Dahlberg 2001). 
This reverses the premise that the state should provide information to the public 
irrespective of its needs. Communicating with the public could instead, and perhaps more 
profitably, be achieved by first addressing what it is the public wishes to know. It does not 
necessarily follow that the public will want, or indeed perceive the need, to engage with 
large amounts of information provided by a governmental institution. 
This is an issue for both public bodies and those providers in the private sector that 
generate online information. Our desire to ‘tell’ in the interests of transparency is often 
not matched by the public’s desire either to know or listen. The sheer quantity and 
complexity of information available from the EU is daunting, even to the most dedicated 
of public scrutineers, and can obfuscate rather than elucidate (Kassim in Featherstone and 
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Radaelli 2003: 85-86). An increase in transparency is not achieved simply through the 
provision of more information. Rather, it is achieved through improvements in the quality, 
accuracy, reliability and completeness of information. This allows for proper oversight of 
regulatory compliance and it is this that provides the integrity essential to the promotion 
of public trust (Kim, Dirks, Cooper and Ferrin 2006). 
Carter and Belanger (2005: 9) note that trust and citizen confidence in electronic 
information are significant predictors of the willingness of citizens to engage with e-
government and that integrity in such information is important in the development of trust. 
In the UK, for example, the obligations for good quality information upon public bodies 
derive from the Nolan Committee’s Seven Principles of Public Life (HM Government 1995) 
that identify the importance of both integrity and accountability in information provision. 
In other words, there is a moral obligation upon public bodies in the UK and further afield 
to ensure the integrity of any information set out in the public domain. However, the 
European Commission’s EU eGovernment Action Plan, 2016-2020 (European Commission 
2016), contains no such direct imperative for the EU to conduct e-government morally or 
ethically, but states that the openness and transparency of information should enhance 
trustworthiness and accountability in the EU. The assumption, therefore, appears to be 
that by making the information available to be scrutinised through public engagement, 
trust in the EU and its information should naturally follow. This is a significant omission. 
Without the assurance of integrity, trust will not automatically follow and trust is a crucial 
element in e-government provision, given that ‘[e]mpirical evidence has also ascertained 
trust as a salient driver of e-government adoption’ (Tan, Benbasat and Cenfetelli 2008:1). 
But if the information from government institutions is not of sufficient quality to provide 
integrity, low trust may result. Schaftheitle et al. (2019) point out that there must be a 
perceived congruence between citizens’ and government’s values (p.5) and that this 
congruence helps to promote trust. Hetherington (1998) argues that low levels of trust 
help to create a political environment in which it is much harder for any political leadership 
to succeed, and it is confidence in the integrity of information provision that helps support 
the development of political trust. 
 
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST 
Van der Meer (2017) described political trust as citizens’ support for an institution or 
parliament in the face of uncertainty about or vulnerability to the actions of both (p.1). 
This is a significant description of political trust because it includes elements of uncertainty 
and unpredictability: uncertainty on the part of the citizen and unpredictability on the part 
of both the institution and the citizen. Other scholars describe trust as something that 
includes ‘faith’ (Rosenburg 1956) and it is clear from Van der Meer’s definition of political 
trust that a leap of faith is required on the part of citizens in the face of such uncertainty 
and unpredictability. 
Grimsley and Mehan look at the issue of evaluating public e-information to promote public 
value and trust in governmental institutions (2007: 134). Public value (Moore 1995) refers 
to the positive contribution, or value, that an organisation makes to society. This is closely 
related to the need for communities and citizens to invest in a trusting relationship with 
the state to establish the ‘faith’ in government referred to above, and Abrams and 
Travaglino (2018) show that this relationship is a significant predictor of voter behaviour. 
In other words, the information produced by a governmental institution must have 
integrity in order to promote trust, and trust will be a reliable predictor of voter behaviour 
and preference.  
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It is trust as a commodity that most private sector companies value in terms of product 
integrity. Private sector e-companies Wikipedia, Amazon and many other providers rely 
on public involvement and scrutiny of information to validate their products and promote 
trust through inviting product or service customer reviews. It is well recognised in the 
private sector that trust is a cashable commodity, but for the public sector this has no 
relation to product. Government investment in information provision is related to 
transparency with a view to promoting public trust in the institution, but this cannot 
happen without information integrity. It is no exaggeration to say that this is an essential 
element in governance. Schwartz (in Van Thiel and Leeuw 2002) affirms that large 
amounts of evaluative information that lack integrity, credibility, accuracy and validity are 
unlikely to promote public trust. 
The need for integrity in information provision has strong connections with both the EU 
and UK governments’ duties to provide good quality information to the public in the 
interests of transparency, but it is only in relatively recent years that the public 
performance of institutions has been of any interest to the general public (Hood 2006; 
European Parliament 2008). Since the advent of New Public Management (NPM), greater 
transparency has been a fundamental requirement in terms of information provision from 
the state (Hood 1991; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). NPM seeks to advance the use of 
private sector practice in the public sector, which includes openness and transparency, 
both for performance and information provision. The issues discussed in this article review 
the involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the activity of public 
scrutiny of information produced by the EU.  
For the EU, the motive for increasing transparency is clearly rooted in an assumption that 
enhancing the provision of information available to citizens will result in gains in public 
trust. There is, however, little evidence that this trust gain is yielding dividends, with only 
43 per cent of EU citizens expressing trust in the EU in the winter 2019 Eurobarometer 
data (Eurobarometer 2019). The article shows that, whilst new transparency tools have 
been designed and introduced to reduce a perceived gap between the EU and its citizens, 
poor internal oversight leads to either inaccurate information being placed in the public 
domain or, frequently, information that - whilst accurate - reveals non-compliant practices. 
Both create a transparency paradox where the systems designed to increase public 
confidence in the institutions can be systematically weaponised by outsider civil society 
organisations (CSOs) to erode this confidence and the trust that derives from it. We argue 
that this transparency paradox is a function of poor in-house quality control processes and 
that this constitutes a material weakness in the institutional transparency regime.  
The article proceeds as follows. Following a short methodology section, the next section 
explores the administration and internal oversight arrangements for the EU’s online 
information systems. Such a process is needed for two reasons. Firstly, it ensures the 
accuracy, and thus integrity, of material made available to EU citizens. Secondly, it acts 
as a check to ensure that this material does not expose a failure to comply with regulations 
and guidelines. The section shows that, whilst the EU has limited resources to oversee and 
check the quality of information, the lack of internal oversight reflects a conscious policy 
decision to delegate this task to EU citizens, reflected in the EU eGovernment Action Plan 
2016-20, as a means of encouraging engagement with, and knowledge of, the EU. The 
third section discusses the role of civil society groups acting as a proxy for this public 
control, and shows that groups frequently use the EU institutions’ transparency tools as a 
weapon in their wider campaigning aims. The nature of this weaponisation is explored in 
the third section’s case study. This charts the involvement of two high profile CSOs that 
regularly monitor the EU’s online registers on behalf of the public and explores the 
weaponisation tactics they employ to publicise irregularities in pursuit of their wider 
campaigning aims.  
 




This research project draws on a total of 22 semi-structured interviews conducted: three 
with officials at the European Parliament, seven with officials at the European Commission 
and 12 with representatives of a range of EU CSOs. The interviews with EU officials 
explored the workings of the administrative and oversight arrangements of the electronic 
registers and captured the institutional view as to the purpose and workings of 
transparency in policymaking, as well as the links between transparency and related ideas 
of trust and accountability. The CSO interviews were all with representatives of groups 
that campaign for increased transparency of EU institutional processes. These interviews 
were conducted with both insider and outsider groups and investigated the different tactics 
used by these groups to further their transparency campaigning aims. All interviews were 
conducted in Brussels between 2012-2015.  
 
ADMINISTRATION AND INTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF THE ONLINE TRANSPARENCY 
PORTAL 
At around 38,000, the total number of staff at the European Commission is relatively small 
for a body representing half a billion citizens. With its complex arrangement of 28 (now 
27) Commissioners and 53 Departments (DGs) and executive agencies, the Commission 
has long been portrayed as bureaucratically fragmented, with decisions made in silos 
(Bauer 2008) and its DGs operating as independent fiefdoms (Kassim 2008).  
In an effort to address this fragmentation, the Commission has sought to ensure its 
processes are ‘steered’ from an executive centre, with its Presidency and Secretariat (DG-
SG) at its heart (Trondal 2012). Trondal found the success of this bureaucratic centre 
formation varied across DGs and services and showed that the Commission was 
broadening the role of DG-SG, placing increased reliance on it as a Commission-wide 
coordinating body. With a staff of 600, DG-SG has a wide remit. This includes ensuring 
the overall coherence of the Commission’s policy proposals, acting as the Commission’s 
interface with the other institutions and supporting the DGs in their contacts with civil 
society. Additionally, DG-SG has overall responsibility for Commission transparency, 
including the information provided to the public through the transparency portal: an online 
citizen resource administered by DG-SG’s Institutional and Administrative Policies (IAP) 
Directorate and accessible through the ‘Europa’ website.  
In order to understand the process of rendering information available through the online 
transparency portal, seven interviews were undertaken: three with senior personnel at the 
European Parliament Secretariat and four with the administrative team of the IAP 
Directorate of the European Commission’s DG-SG. These interviews revealed that at both 
institutions the upkeep of online registers is undertaken by a single individual. At the 
Commission, the overall responsibility lies with IAP, with the routine maintenance and 
upkeep of this register conducted by a single administrative assistant within the unit, whilst 
at the European Parliament, responsibility for the registers lies with the Members’ 
Administration Unit, but with the routine work again undertaken by a single administrative 
assistant. Shapiro (1999) warned of this, drawing attention to organisations’ reliance on a 
single individual, sometimes through pressure of work, to filter information via the 
internet, especially in government (p.7). This, he says, is a danger; one that can 
undermine the integrity and trust crucial for governmental institutions. Information may 
be viewed as more robust and trustworthy if it were overseen by an independent body or 
group of people tasked with ensuring accuracy. Credibility is an essential resource for 
organisations, especially those in government who bear an ethical responsibility for the 
accuracy and integrity of information. Establishing this credibility helps to develop a 
reputation for providing correct information (Keohane and Nye 1998: 89). Accuracy 
encourages and supports the development of trust on the part of the public. The fragility 
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of relying on a single individual seems therefore imprudent and risky and the issue of trust 
in that single individual on the part of the organisation is doubly important. Moreover, 
using an individual to produce, police and update information for an organisation bestows 
control, and potentially power, upon that individual.  
Initial questions to interview participants sought to understand how the portal is 
administered and the degree of institutional oversight to ensure the data published on the 
registers is accurate and compliant with institutional regulations and guidance. In each 
case, participants asserted that their organisations lacked both the capacity and resources 
to conduct regulatory compliance oversight or to test data for accuracy, stating that 
responsibility for these issues lay with the individual registrants at the Parliament, and 
with the chef de cabinet of the relevant DG at the Commission.  
In addition to this resource issue, Parliament officials mobilised legal arguments to explain 
the lack of any institutional oversight of the register.  
We do not certify the information correct. We cannot. We do not have the 
means to police it and there is no legal basis for us to do so - we rely on 
self-control and public control (Parliament secretariat official). 
For those involved specifically with the Commission’s online registers, the resource issue 
was again raised, but here there was a view that responsibility for ensuring the accuracy 
of the data and regulatory compliance lay with the institutions, but at DG level, rather 
than centrally.   
It is for each DG to ensure the information is correct. Even if there was time, 
we could not check the content because only the DGs know about [their 
expert groups] … and there are nearly a thousand groups across all the DGs 
(Commission policy officer). 
However, discussion concerning the routine administration of the Commission’s Register 
of Expert Groups revealed an important factor relating to accuracy and compliance of the 
register. Three interview participants within the IAP Directorate commented that, although 
responsibility for checking the data provided in the register lay with the individual groups’ 
parent DGs, variations in directorates’ internal processes produced uneven results. To 
illustrate, whilst institutional arrangements require each DG to have a nominated individual 
with responsibility for the register, DGs interpret this role and its functions differently. As 
a result, day to day responsibility for the online register may lie with a fairly senior policy 
officer or coordinator, a relatively junior administrative assistant or, in some cases, a 
temporary intern (Commission administrative officer). As discussed, trust and accuracy in 
information provision are inextricable. If the EU desire for increased trust is to be believed, 
the dislocation between this desire and the inability to ‘police’ the information will always 
preclude the development of trust in the organisation. This must be addressed if the EU 
truly wishes to enhance trust in their organisation. 
This is not unusual, particularly in modern public services in the UK and where resources 
are scarce, but the lack of resources available to ‘police’ accuracy in information provision 
in the EU is interesting given the serious implications of producing inaccurate information. 
When the UK began to consider the possibility of public scrutiny of its information, 
safeguards, checks and balances were put in place. Yet accurate information provision and 
its integrity are highly valued commodities, particularly in the private sector, for the 
purpose of bolstering company integrity with potential customers. Reputation online is 
valuable, and this view is echoed in the EU eGovernment Action Plan, 2016-2020 
(European Commission 2016). A further question is why the EU should not elect to put 
more resources into checking or policing its information provision at this level, especially 
when the EU itself began the move in 1999 to bring its information to everyone in Europe 
via the internet (Irani, Love, Elliman, Jones et. al. 2005: 62).  
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It seems clear then, that the internal QA procedure for the online registers is - at best - 
inconsistent, reflecting the limited resources available. Generally, however, there is little 
public engagement with these electronic registers (Field 2013), suggesting that reliance 
on ‘public control’ to ensure the integrity of a large and varied array of information is 
rather ambitious, a point supported by Keohane and Nye’s observation that ‘[a] plenitude 
of information leads to poverty of attention’ (1998: 89). Given this, the role undertaken 
by those civil society groups that monitor and police the online registers is clearly 
important in terms of providing a check on the accuracy of the registers. Importantly, 
however, these groups have limited resources to undertake this monitoring and they are 
therefore selective in the scrutiny they undertake on behalf of EU citizens, an issue 
explored in the next section.  
 
CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS AS A PROXY FOR PUBLIC CONTROL OF INFORMATION 
As the European Ombudsman acknowledged in her speech at the European Parliament, in 
practical terms, the EU institutions’ transparency processes are generally used by civil 
society groups acting on behalf of EU citizens. This section considers the role of civil society 
groups as both transparency monitors and advocates. 
A number of Brussels-based societal groups have areas of activity which particularly focus 
on the relationship between the EU institutions and the corporate sector. For example, the 
group European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ) campaigns for tighter regulation on 
financial disclosure by multi-national companies (ECCJ 2019).  To monitor this, ECCJ 
campaigns for greater transparency of the EU policymaking process. In that sense, 
transparency is a tool to meet its wider campaign aim to expose the institutional-corporate 
relationship around financial regulation. Generally, civil society groups have limited 
resources and expertise to allocate to transparency activities and so exercise this scrutiny 
function in one of two ways. For a few groups, a specific individual is responsible for 
overseeing activities in the institutions. For example, both the Madrid based Access Info 
Europe (AIE) and the Brussels based Transparency International (EU) (TI-EU) have, within 
a small team of eight to ten personnel, a single individual solely responsible for promoting 
and monitoring transparency at the EU institutions. Similarly, the Brussels based Friends 
of the Earth Europe (FoEE) has a former Commission employee responsible only for 
monitoring the activities of and liaising with the Commission.  
However, whilst each of these three groups campaigns for greater EU transparency, there 
are some differences. FoEE - like ECCJ - campaigns for transparency as a means to further 
its Economic Justice campaign. In that sense, transparency is the group’s ancillary 
objective: a means to an end. By contrast, both AIE and TI-EU have transparency as a 
core campaigning aim - an end in itself - with the transparency specialist working across 
policy areas.  
Even amongst the core transparency groups there are significant differences, as some 
work closely with the EU institutions. The Brussels chapter of Transparency International 
- its EU liaison office - consists of ten paid staff, augmented by a small number of 
volunteers (TI-EU 2016). In 2013, approximately 40 per cent of the funding for its EU 
office was provided by DG Education and Culture (DG EAC) and it has a presence on a 
small number of Commission expert advisory groups (TI-EU 2016).  In 2012, TI-EU was 
selected as Brussels ‘NGO of the year’ by the European public affairs community (EPACA 
2015).  
Despite having approximately the same number of staff as TI-EU, and with a very similar 
operating budget, the Brussels based core transparency group Corporate Europe 
Observatory (CEO) receives no EU funding. Describing itself as a research and campaign 
group, CEO’s structure differs from that of TI-EU in that it appears to be a stand-alone 
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organisation, rather than one acting under an umbrella group. Interestingly, however, two 
of CEO’s six-person advisory board are members of the Amsterdam-based Transnational 
Institute of Policy Studies (TNI). TNI, established in 1974, describes itself as a group of 
‘activist researchers’ committed to ‘confronting corporate globalisation’ (TNI 2015).  
It seems clear that these proxy groups have their own agendas in relation to information 
scrutiny. This creates a transparency paradox as this agenda is at odds with the clear 
intention expressed in the European Commission’s Action Plan (European Commission 
2016): that EU citizens should have the opportunity to scrutinise and correct the 
information provided in order to ensure accuracy, openness and transparency (2:4), which 
should promote trust. The next section considers this transparency paradox in practice, 
by exploring how one such group uses the EU’s transparency tools to weaponise 
information in pursuit of its wider campaigning aims. 
 
CASE STUDY: CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS’ OVERSIGHT OF DG ENTERPRISE (DG 
ENTR) 
This section examines how a Brussels-based campaigning group - the Alliance for Lobbying 
Transparency and Ethics Regulation (ALTER-EU) - identified irregularities in the 
Commission’s online register of expert groups and successfully used high profile tactics to 
force the Commission to address these irregularities.   
Although formally separate from the longer-standing campaigning organisation CEO, 
ALTER-EU and CEO have always been closely linked. CEO itself was established in 
Amsterdam in 1997 but later moved to Brussels where it currently shares an office building 
with ALTER-EU.  CEO also shares ALTER-EU’s campaigning aims, with a stated role to 
‘expose and challenge the power of corporate lobbying over European Union policy-
making’ (CEO 2019). The apparent closeness of the two groups is borne out by analysis 
of the relevant entries on the EU’s Joint Transparency Register (JTR). The same individual 
is listed as the permanent person in charge of EU relations, whilst the financial disclosure 
section of ALTER-EU’s entry lists CEO as its largest funder, providing for more than fifty 
per cent of its total operating budget (JTR 2016).  
Launched in 2005 and composed of approximately 200 societal groups, trade unions and 
academics, ALTER-EU represents members ‘concerned with the increasing influence 
exerted by corporate lobbyists on the political agenda in Europe’ (ALTER-EU 2019).  The 
organisation is open to any group or individual in broad sympathy with its campaigning 
aims. ALTER-EU has a coordinator who actively identifies and approaches potential 
members. Its membership is extremely broad and includes consumer organisations, 
environmental groups and groups supporting the rights of indigenous people. The obvious 
logic to this arrangement is that it provides mutual benefits. ALTER-EU is able to present 
itself as a representative of a broad membership whilst even the smallest constituent group 
has its voice amplified. For both, there are increased access opportunities as this 
arrangement meets the Commission’s long-established consultation principles whereby it 
prefers to engage with groups that can show that they represent a plurality of views. 
In the conduct of their roles, both CEO and ALTER-EU adopt similar high-profile tactics to 
publicise particular instances of perceived over-representation of the corporate sector in 
the policy forums.  Both groups’ websites give access to reports with titles such as 
Corporate Capture in Europe (CEO 2018).  
In July 2010, ALTER-EU submitted a complaint to the European Ombudsman in which it 
argued that the high incidence of business interests within the Commission Expert Groups 
represented ‘regulatory capture’ by the corporate sector. To provide evidence for this 
claim, ALTER-EU presented a detailed analysis of the expert groups in a single directorate: 
DG Enterprise (DG ENTR). Subsequently, ALTER-EU published the data in a report sub-
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titled, The dominance of corporate lobbyists in DG Enterprise’s expert groups. In its 
format, this report - with its catchy title and visually striking cover - resembled others 
published by ALTER-EU and CEO. The report contained analysis of the information ALTER-
EU had gathered from the online Register of Expert Groups which showed both non-
compliance with Commission guidelines on balanced expert groups and inaccurate 
information through non-provision of information. The report stated that, of non-
governmental expert advisers at DG ENTR, 482 were from the corporate sector compared 
to 255 from other non-government sectors. The complaint cited this data, arguing that 
the information provided showed 32 of the 83 expert groups at DG ENTR to be ‘dominated 
by big business’; a finding that it said was probably an underestimate because data on 
several of DG ENTR’s expert groups was missing entirely from the Commission’s register 
(ALTER-EU 2016).  
To mark the launch of the report, ALTER-EU held a public event (attended by one of this 
article’s authors) at the Brussels headquarters of the Press Association. The event was co-
organised with the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) and took the form of a panel 
discussion of the report. The panel was chaired by a senior activist from the Economic 
Justice Unit of Friends of the Earth Europe - a campaign group represented on ALTER-EU’s 
steering committee. The three speakers were Yiorgos Vassalos from CEO, Denis De Jong 
MEP from the Nordic Green Left party and Lluis Prats from DG ENTR. Speakers were given 
a short time to present their organisations’ positions on the report, followed by a panel 
discussion and audience question and answer session.  
At the audience session, virtually every question was addressed to the Commission 
representative and related to detailed aspects of the report. Whilst it initially appeared 
surprising that audience members had been able to digest the report in the short time 
available, it was apparent that those selected for questions tended to be individuals 
associated with CEO and Friends of the Earth Europe.  Although a number of mainstream 
journalists were present at the event, the only one selected to ask a question was the 
freelance journalist and transparency campaigner David Cronin. The questions directed to 
Prats tended to be hostile in tone, with many employing the language used in the report, 
including the phrases ‘… puppet of big business’ and ‘… corporate capture’. Here it seemed 
that the event conveners sought not just to raise the profile of the report itself but also to 
weaponise its contents by magnifying both the imbalance in the expert groups at DG ENTR 
and the information missing from the report that had led to ALTER-EU’s complaint to the 
Ombudsman.  
Following the complaint, the Ombudsman forwarded ALTER-EU’s complaint to the 
Commission, inviting it to submit an opinion concerning the specific allegations in the 
complaint. In the opening paragraph of its 75-page response - published on ALTER-EU’s 
website - the Commission’s letter stated:  
Over the past few years, ALTER-EU has written to the Commission several 
times on expert group related issues. In its replies, the Commission has 
always provided ALTER-EU with relevant and detailed information. In 
addition … the complainant and officials from the Commission met on 22 
September 2009 for an informal discussion on some of the issues raised by 
ALTER-EU (ALTER-EU 2016). 
The Commission’s letter seems to demonstrate an informal but ongoing dialogue between 
the Commission and ALTER-EU, although the expert group complaint discussed above was 
actually submitted ten months after the meeting described in the Commission’s response. 
In addressing the particular allegation of imbalance in the EGs at DG ENTR, the 
Commission stated that: 
[The Commission] has fully acknowledged that a fair balance of non-
industry stakeholders’ representation in consultation processes has still to 
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be achieved. In that respect, the Commission is committed to seek an 
adequate presence of civil society representative in its EGs in the area of 
internal market, both in setting-up new groups and in re-arranging the 
composition of existing ones where appropriate (ALTER-EU 2016). 
The Commission’s response alerted interested parties to the Commission’s apparent 
undertaking to address the composition of the expert groups at DG ENTR.  During the 
summer of 2012, DG ENTR announced that the composition of thirteen groups would be 
modified through a single call for expressions of interest. This call was published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) on 1 September and a link to the call was 
also published on the Register of Expert Groups. The deadline for applications was 31 
October 2012. 
By comparing the archival database with the later version of the register, it is clear that 
limited changes were introduced in the composition of the expert groups at DG ENTR. 
Correspondence with the relevant official at DG ENTR provided information concerning the 
number of responses to the call for expressions of interest, broken down into the relevant 
groups. Table 1 shows the changes in the composition of the expert groups at DG ENTR 
following ALTER-EU’s complaint to the Ombudsman: 
Table 1 - Responses to calls for expressions of interest 
Group Name Orig. No. Applications 
Received 





 56  2  0  
Motorcycles  57  5  2 1 x Consumer; 1 x 
Research 
Motor Vehicles  89  8  4 1 x Consumer; 1 x 
Research; 1 x      
Environment; 1 x Road 
Safety 
Gas Appliances  52  1  0  
Forestry and Forest 
Industries 
 44  3  0  
Explosives  39  5  1 Research 
Mission Evolution  27  6  1 Consumer Organisation 
Fertilizers  55  1  1 Research 
ICT Standardisation  55  6  1 Disabled People 
Raw Materials 
Supply  
 62  46  5 4 x Research; 1 x Trade 
Unions 
Eco Design  56  6  0  
Measuring 
Instruments 
 47  0  0  
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As Table 1 shows, in most cases very few applications were made. Where applications 
were received but without a subsequent appointment, the Commission considered that the 
applicant lacked the relevant experience. Just one group received a large number of 
applications, but most of these came from organisations that were already members of 
the group. In total, fifteen additional appointments from outside industry and the corporate 
sector were made to the expert groups at DG ENTR, representing a modest shift of 2.3 
per cent representation from business to non-business interests. 
 
DISCUSSION 
At one level, the case examined above shows that a high-profile intervention by a 
campaigning group can affect institutional change. ALTER-EU’s complaint to the European 
Ombudsman resulted in DG ENTR introducing changes to the composition of its expert 
groups and addressing inaccurate and non-compliant entries on the registers. The nature 
of this intervention is significant, however. ALTER-EU’s complaint to the Ombudsman 
followed its analysis of the composition of the Commission Expert Groups at DG ENTR only. 
In its public response, DG ENTR acknowledged that there was a degree of imbalance in 
these groups, although it argued that earlier invitations issued to NGOs to participate in 
its Expert Groups had not been taken up. This, coupled with the fact that DG ENTR’s raison 
d’être was to be ‘the voice of industry and enterprise in European policy making’ perhaps 
goes some way to explain its reliance on business representatives within its expert groups. 
In terms of the extent to which the monitoring groups conduct oversight, it is clear such 
groups have limited resources, so the degree of scrutiny they can undertake is necessarily 
selective. This, coupled with the lack of resources in DGs themselves, creates a structural 
inability to police and scrutinise the large quantity of information produced by the EU. As 
a result, the aspiration of public scrutiny and correction set out in the Action Plan 
(European Commission 2016: 4) has not been achieved to date; a situation that seems 
likely to persist in the context of the ongoing tight fiscal constraints around resource 
allocation.   In itself, with adequate resources, selective scrutiny is neither unusual nor 
problematic and it can be an effective tool to modify behaviour or ensure compliance with 
regulation - a company that has a random drug testing regime or employs monthly spot 
checks of expense claims, for example. For the campaigning groups in this case, however, 
there is a crucial difference: the selective scrutiny is not random. Particular directorates 
and policy areas are singled out for attention, with this choice reflecting the groups’ 
campaigning interests. Thus, with a logo that includes the strapline We expose the power 
of corporate lobbying in the EU, it is unsurprising that CEO’s institutional oversight tends 
to focus on those directorates where corporate influence is most likely. Beyond this 
disproportionate focus on certain directorates, the publicity-maximising tactics by the 
monitoring groups facilitated by the EU’s poor internal QA processes creates a 
transparency paradox: the information provided by the EU institutions can be weaponised 
by those accessing this information. 
In the management of the public event at the ÖGB, and particularly in the selection and 
tone of the questions, it was evident that the main purpose of the report’s launch event - 
arguably, of the report itself - was to provide a forum for supporters of CEO and ALTER-
EU to maximise the impact of the latter’s complaint to the European Ombudsman. 
Significantly, the group had used the publicly available online Register of Expert Groups 
to gather the information for its report and to identify instances where information was 
missing from the register. As one of a number of registers hosted on the transparency 
portal, it was one of those cited by Commission Officials as a means of enhancing citizen 
confidence in the institutions. In this case, however, the transparency portal provided the 
means for ALTER-EU to select data that would reinforce its charge of ‘corporate capture’ 
and so maximise the reputational damage to the Commission. The expressed intention for 
citizens and businesses to correct and control their own information (European 
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Commission 2016: 4) seems naïve in view of the ‘weaponisation’ of information for the 
exclusive ends of campaigning groups. Instead of increasing trust in the EU, this 
weaponisation has allowed the EU to be subject to targeted and focused attacks, largely 
as a result of having pursued a policy of laissez-faire governance in relation to accuracy 
and completeness of information through the online registers. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated that the EU’s transparency processes are severely hampered 
by a lack of resources and internal quality checks allowing inaccurate or incomplete data 
to find its way into the public domain. This is likely to compromise any attempt to promote 
public trust, which relies upon the integrity, accuracy and veracity of information provision. 
It follows that any demonstration that information put out by the EU is unreliable, 
questionable or inconsistent will not lend credence to any bid for greater trust and 
integrity. The data provided through the transparency mechanisms are not routinely 
inspected for accuracy before publication, neither is a spot-check regime in place. 
Furthermore, citizens are not routinely engaging with EU information either to check or 
correct it in a way that seems to have been anticipated in the strategies and action plans 
published by the EU about e-information provision. The EU’s desire to tell is not matched 
by the citizens’ desire to listen, and certainly not by an eagerness to check for accuracy 
and compliance with complex regulations and guidelines. Moreover, the reliance on single 
individuals to generate and correct information within DGs leaves the institution vulnerable 
to both abuse and risk. By neglecting to apply standard regulatory management practice 
in information provision, the EU has abdicated responsibility for ensuring that the data it 
provides on the registers is accurate, instead leaving this function to the unreliable and 
unregulated checks and balances of public control. This shows a clear dislocation between 
the EU’s stated wish to enhance public trust and its ability to provide accurate, complete 
- and therefore trustworthy - information. The article has shown that public checking and 
control of the information is chiefly conducted by proxy groups with a campaigning interest 
in publicising inconsistencies and irregularities. The article adds to the existing scholarship 
on transparency by identifying that placing information in the public domain needs careful 
management to avoid diminishing, rather than enhancing, public trust. As the case study 
shows, any transparency breach can be used by campaigning groups to create a 
transparency paradox. Here, the systems designed to enhance citizen confidence in the 
EU institutions are instead used by campaigning groups, with the information provided 
weaponised by these groups to erode public confidence and trust in the organisation. 
The case study discussed in this article identifies two aspects to this transparency paradox. 
Firstly, whilst the case study shows that the scrutiny of public control by a campaigning 
group can be effective, the selective nature of this scrutiny coupled with the limited 
resources available to the groups, means that there is no oversight of areas which do not 
meet the groups’ campaigning aims. This leaves some directorates and policy areas 
virtually exempt from scrutiny and so there is little incentive to ensure the accuracy and 
completeness of the information placed in the public domain. This challenges the clear 
intention of the EU to provide good quality information that enhances public trust and EU 
transparency. Secondly, the delegation of responsibility for scrutiny to public control 
provides an opportunity for campaigning groups to identify and then amplify what might 
otherwise be considered fairly minor transgressions. In this way, the absence of an in-
house QA process allows the transparency tools that were introduced to engender public 
trust in the EU to be used to undermine that trust. Given that the EU in general – and the 
European Ombudsman in particular – link transparency to the restoration of citizen 
confidence and trust, the provision of inaccurate and incomplete information appears 
something of an own goal. As such, it seems clear that the lack of an in-house scrutiny 
process to oversee the quality of the information constitutes a material weakness in the 
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EU’s transparency regime, and a salutary lesson to governments that reliance on public 
scrutiny of online information can be potentially damaging. 
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